This paper seeks to offer a new perspective on the linkage between global leadership and the role of epistemic communitie s in international relations. The issue of bil at eral trad e liberali zation between Great Brit ain and its trading partn ers rose to promin ence on the global agenda in the 1700s by the efforts of British political economi sts and merchants. These efforts were prompted by changes in economic relation s brou ght about by th e Industrial Revolution and its impact on the mercantile system. While this group was small in numb er and its int eractions rudim entary by 20th Century standards , it nonetheless met the qu alification s specified by man y scholars. It is furth er argu ed th at such communi ties arc linked to the exercise of global leader ship in the long cy cle model's phases of agenda settin g and coalition buildin g. They arc start ed and based in the global leader, and are nurtured by the relatively open social and politi cal structures of that leader. Evid ence supportin g this argum ent strengthens the long cycle model's explan atory pow er with regard to agenda settin g, coalition creation, and the role of innovative solutions to global probl ems, and makes preeminence in knowledge -based commu nities another dim ension of global leadership.
11 ( l) 
"In theface o.luncertainty, a publicly recognized group with an unchallenged claim to understanding the technical nature o.lthe regime' s substantive issue -area was able to interpr et.for traditional decision makers facts or events in new ways and thereby lead to new forms o.lbehavior.
11 (2) The shift in the Europ ean domin ated world economy in the middle of the 1700 s to a more libera l tradin g system ba~cd on the norms of reduced tariff~, reciproc ity, the redu ction of restrictions on merchants , and the use of a most-favo red -nation clause to includ e states into this trading community stands in marked contrast with the mcrcantilistic practices of the previous two centuries. The Industrial Rcvolutionjustbcginning in Western Europe was already changing the global issue agenda. States, and powerful actors within them, were faced with a new set of problems with regard to international trade and economic grO\vth a.., the certainty of the old mercantile rules were shaken by the effects of new technologies and trading interests created. In such an environm ent, the influence of a small group of British political economists and merchants would be decisive in helping to set the agenda for world politics.
This group formed a proto-typical epistemic community and is linked to the exercise of global leadership in the agenda setting and coalition formation pha..,cs of the long cycle model of world politics. It is ba..,cd in the global leader, and is instrumental in diffusing new ideas and policies to other states, a.., well a.., helping to lay th e groundwork for future cooperative actions by coalition members. Linking the role of epistemic communiti es to the exercise of global leadership means that leadership in such an environment will rest, not only on traditional [Page 2] Journa I of World-Systems Research material mca.., urcs of power like milit ary forces and macroeconomic factors, but also on a ba..,c of epistemic communities able to frame new issues and solutions to problems designed to benefit the global leader and its coalition partners.
This article proceeds with: 1) discussion of the concept.., of global leadership that relate to the functions of episte mic communities, 2) examination of the characteristics of th e epistemic community of the 1700s, 3) community impact on the policies of th e governments of the trading community, and 4) utility of this approach for the study of current American foreign policy in an era of world politics that can ca.., ily be characterized a.., agenda setting.
IL
Leadership in world politics ha.., been well defined by David Rapkin a.., the performance of some ta..,k or service for the world society, influ encing the actions of others through persuasion, winning international economic and military competitions, and serving a.., a role model for other states in the provision of innovative political and social practices. (3) During the agenda setting pha..,c of world politics, global problems arc defined, clarifi ed, and prioritized. Epistemic Communities perform this ta..,k for the global political society. In a situation of uncertainty, they define the new problems faced by states and use their expertise to outline possible solutions. Without the capacity to coerce cooperation through the use of economic or political force, they exerc ise influence throu gh the exchange and diffusion of idea ... . Their ability to persuade political decision makers in t he leading state, and then to diffuse policy choices to other states, depends on the solutions they offer to problems on the agenda.
Global leaders arc those states who have won economic competitions to create worldwide trade networks, expand them during the industrial revolution, and institutionalize them through a framework of agreements and organizations among states. The y have won military competitions in global wars in which the social, political, and economic relationships purposefully developed over the years before the war hav e been the foundations for victorious coalition warfare. They have been states with the social and political structures which allow for and reward the actions of [Page 3] Journa I of World-Systems Research innovation by groups representing academia, religion, trade, and the sciences. In every competition, the ability to define the issues at stake and promote policies ben eficial to the global leader and others has been the key to creating a coalition strong enough to win global wars and exercise governance of the world system afterwards. (4) All of these activities depend on non-coercive leadership, that is, on lead ership demonstrated by a role model. Epistemic communities in a global leader serve as role model.., for similar groups in other states. They demonstrate that the relatively open economic, political, and social systems of the global leader arc fertile ground for innovative solutions to problems faced by the world system, and that those solutions may benefit man y states, not just one .
This definition of global leadership stands in contrast to the descriptions of he gemonic leadership provided by realists and capitalist world-economy theorists.
Realists with a historical perspective (Gilpin, Kennedy, and Holsti ) , argue that hegemonic states arise when one state increases its relative gross economic and financial power and is able to translat e that power into politico-military power. (5) This state is able to overcome the systemic bias toward anarchy and equilibrium to set and enforce systemwide rules governing the use of force and the flows of int ernational trade.
The dominant outlook, which has encompassed both classical and ncor calist writings since World War II, is that the pe riod from 1648 to 1815 was charact erized by power balancing among the European states that formed the heart of int ernati onal politics. No one state met the realist criteria for hegemony until the onset of the Pax Britannica in 1815.
The world-econom y theorists (Braudel , Wallcrs tcin, Chase-Dunn , Gills, and Gunder Frank) have also developed a clear understanding of hegemonic states within th e larger system. (6) State behavior is driven by the expansion and development of th e system's transnati onal capital, labo r, and informat ion marke ts. Fragmen ted political units (states) have competed for control of the core of this system and it.., concentration of capital, advanced production capabilities, skilled labor, and commercial network-;. A hegemonic state is one that ha-; emerged victorious from the armed struggle for that control,and ha-; achieved the simultaneous dominance of the system's production, commercial, and financial resources. This state will aggressively support and expand the capitalist worldcconomy into new area-; of peripheral exploitation.
In these models, the only hegemonic states have been: the Dutch from 1620 to 1650, the British from 1815 to 1873, and the United States from 1945 to 1968. Wallcrstcin, for example, [Page 4] Journa I of World-Systems Research holds that the 1700s were marked by core competition between France and Great Britain, and that it wa-; not until the end of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars that the issue of which state would control the core of the capitalist world-economy wa-; settled.
This article is grounded in the long cycle tradition (sec Modcl.;;ki and Thompson), w ith its cmpha-;is on problem solving and structured pha-;cs of global Icade rship and global political evolution. (7) It acknowledges the importance of the proc esses of agenda setting and coalition creation to the rise of global leadership states.
Coming at the problem from this perspective concentrates attention on the period in question and how leadership is exercised in the processes mention ed above. It will also demand a broader dcfintion of leadership than ha-; been put forward by the other global system perspectives. It is in this vein that the article proceeds to the role of epist emic communities, leadership, and problem solving.
Recent literature on epistemic communities helps to cement a connection between Rapkin's definition ofl eadcrship and the role of such communities in the world system. "An important response to adversity by parts of the political public, especiall y academics, professionals, and the intclligcnt-;ia, is to develop new idea-;, includin g polic y proposals. This is not a new phenomenon; troubled times often stimulate thinkin g.
11 (8) Agenda setting pha-;cs of world poli tics arc situations of adversity, they arc 'troubled tim es'. Power in the system is dcconccntratcd a-; the old governing coalition finishes executing its solutions to old agenda problem-; and starts to lose cohesion. States and other actors arc challenged by new issues and may be ill prepar ed to meet them. In fact, they may be having trouble making sense of the rapid change they face.
Judith Golds tein, lookin g at the impact of idea-; on trade policy in the United States, concluded tha t institu tions arc subject to inert ia. (9) She argued that cris es occurred when structures could no t meet the deman ds of the international environment; they became malleable to new coalitions with alternative plans to "overcom e the probl ems at hand. 11 A crisis must be met by a supply of new ideas for restructuring policies to meet changing economic and political needs. The policies that sufficed to solve the structural problems during one cycle of world politics may be unsuited to a new agenda.
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During the agenda setting phase of world politics, there is not merely a power transition taking place, but a structural shift in the focus of the whole system and the actors within it. In these phases, the state of technology, the distribution of power, the force of domestic groups and processes, and political events arc all changing rapidly. The result is that the attention of states and other actors must be changed. New assessments of what are systemic problems, and what can be done ab out them can find room for growth and development in this atmosphere. It is in just these conditions that Emmanuel Adler finds the optimal chances for the success of epistemic communities and their agendas. (l 0) Some researchers have found that during sue h periods the growing demands of states for new ideas and information arc matched by the growth of "sizeab le and self-conscious" groups which frame issues and specify a range of options for policy mak ers. Peter Haas note s that these state demands are for information about social or physical processes, their interrelation to other processes, and the likely consequences of various actions requiring significant expertise. (l l) Leadership during the agenda setting phase of world politics is characterized by precisely the type of activities that arc described above. It is a time of political and economic uncertai nty in the world system, and the possession of a group of individuals capable of providing information based on theoretically sound ideas and backed up by knowledge garnered from research or ongoing interactions is an important facet of lead ership.
The diffusion of an epistemic community's influ ence from within the global leader to other states in the system is an important part of the long process of coalition creation. It is integra l to the non-co ercive leadership needed to build a winning coalition at the global level. Wh at must take place over time is a shift in the perceptions of int erests by the global leader and other states with who m it cooperates. Peter Haas hold s that th e diffu sion of new ideas can lead to new patterns of behavior and thus to internat ional policy coordination because epistemic communities create channels from experts to experts and from experts to governments both within and between states . (12 ) William Drake and Kalypso Nicolaidis, examining agenda setting within the GATT, concluded that the process was dominated by an Anglo -American core group that first posed the issues and then set the terms of discourse . (13) Policy makers arc learning from epistemic community members to alter expectations and interests. They proceed to try and convince other states to change their expectations and interests to conform to the new reality that ha.., been described by the epistemic community. Leadership in this environment is not a function of economic coercion (which is subject to rapid change during agenda setting), nor is it a function of military coercion (a.., power is dcconccntratcd in the system); rather it is a matter of persuading others that the leader ha.., correctly prioritized global problems, conceived credible alternative solutions to them, and provided information to support its claims to lead a coalition of states to their resolution. Once this position ha.., been attained, the political skills of coalition leadership and the economic and military power of a state reaching for global leadership come into play.
The next a..,pcct of leadership outlin ed by Rapkin, winning competitions, is not covered extensively in epistemic community literature. However, there arc a few points that can serve to support the general arguments made here. Epistemic communities that are dynamic and growing during the policy formation process within the domestic structure of the world leader arc those that arc able to push outward into the international arena. Competition at the national level tics decision makers and community members to sets of idea.., and processes that are then projected outward through formal and informal structures. Emmanuel Adler (15) and Fred Kaplan, (16) studying nuclear arms control policy and nuclear weapons strategy respectively, highlight this process at the national and international levels.
Peter Hall's work on the spread of Keynesian economic policies through the West during the first half of the 20th Century supports this general outline. (17) Th ere wa.., significant competition between competing economic theories to respond to a new set of economic problems faced by industrial democracies. There wa.., the success of the epistemic communities in the
Anglo-American core and the subsequent expansion of the community and its policies to other states with similar systems. Those ideas were given legitimacy as the governing principles of macroeconomic policy for a generation following their triumph in the 1930s and 1940s.
The last dimension of leadership raised by Rapkin was that of service as a role model for other actors. An epistemic community in a world leader demonstrates how to influenc e policy through the provision of new information and new ideas, how to gain access to policy makers, and how to translate influence into policy. This process is watched by similar actors in other states and, if proven successful, emulated by them in their own states. Interaction between communities in many states and between policy makers in those states will increase along with policy coordination.
A good example of this is Kaplan's study of the civilian nuclear strategists who created and shaped policy in the United States during the Cold War. They dominated technical and strategic information, had access to the highest levels of the government (both civilian and military), and carried out a steady education campaign with policy makers in the United States and its allies and with other strategists in allied states. Likewise, Robert Rothstein's study of international commodity negotiations concluded that stabl e international agreements rested on a pillar of shared analytical assumptions by experts which were used to inform and influence government negotiators in key states. (18) If we take Rapkin's definition of leadership and a long cycle description of the agenda setting and coalition creation phases of world politics, we have a situation where the role ofECs can be significant. The exercise ofleadership within this context is heavily influ enced by the preeminent position held by epistemic communiti es within the future leader of the system . The existence of just such a community based in Great Britain at the start of the Industrial Revolution would prove to be instrum ental in propelling th e British to the leadership of a liberal trading coalition strong enough to replace the old mercantil e system which had dominated the world economy with a more liberal system able to provide more absolute benefits to Britain and its trading partners.
III.
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To describe the network of political economists and merchant5 of the early industrial revolution, it is importan t to have a clear understanding of the charact eristics and functions of such communiti es.
A-; a first point, epistemic communities do not have to be large in numbers to have influence in international relations. More important than numbers arc: the level-; of respect for members within their discipline, the ability of members to exercise influence within their discipline, and their ability to access actors in policymaking positions. (19) Epistemic communities have four distinguishing characteristics which can be used as mca-;urcmcnts for the British ca-;c: l) shared nonnative value ba-;c and set of principled belicfa, 2) shared set of causal belie£-, ba-,cd on analysis of observed practices, 3) shared notion of evaluating and validating knowledge, and 4) common polic y enterprises. (20) The political economists and merchants who created a new way of thinking about international economic relations were bound by a common judg ement that a high value should be placed on the creation of wealth by individuals and states. They argued that there wa-; a connection between economic freedom and political freedom, and that the encouragement of such freedom-; wa-; to be valued. (21) Adam Smith's "Wealth of Nations", published in 1776, wa-; not the first work on liberalized trade, but wa-; built on a foundation of continual interaction with other likcmindcd economists and earlier works in the field. Smith's work brought under one title a number of idea-; that had been gaining legitimacy for the previous quarter-c entury. David Hume, Arthur Young, Josiah Tucker, the political-economy clubs of Scotland and England, the physiocrats in France, and the anti-Camcralists in the German states all provided component parts of what would be the most powerful economic message of the industrial era. Thes e persons and groups argued that greater cc onomic freedoms at home and new international economic arrangements would create wealthier, mor e producti ve citizens, which would improve the social and political stability of the state and society.
This community also shared a common view of the cause and effect relationships of the new world economic and political problems surrounding the industrial revolution. The cause of
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Journal of World-Systems Research those problems wa-; the outmoded international mercantile system of trade: the concept of wealth based on ama.:;sing specie, the restriction of colonial mark ets, and state monopolies in imports and exports. The effects of continuing the mercantile system in the face ofrapidly changing technologies, import and export needs, and domestic economic actors were also agreed upon by community members.
To the Physiocrats in France, the system resulted in stagnant agricultural production, lower standards ofliving, a diminished state trca-;ury, and political instabilit y. (23) Josiah Tucker's "Essay on Trade" (1749) argued that continued adherence to strict mercantil e principles would not increase trade or improve the commercial position of Britain in relation to her competitors. (24) The political economy clubs being founded in Scotland and England "experienced a keen sense of the inadequacy of certain accustomed w ays of doing things ... " (25) . The effects of the mercantile system were disincenti ves for inventions, decreases in imports needed for increa'ling production, and burdensome taxes .
In the German states, the anti-Cameralists at the University of Gottingen concluded that the strict mercantilism of Prussia stifled economic growth and empowered the central state authorities. (26) What information would community members use to judge the progress of the industrial revolution, the domestic reactions of states to its effects, and the progress of the international trading arrangements away from mercantilism toward liberalism? Without the formal structures and interactions familiar to epistemic community members they managed to agree to a remarkable degree on evaluative methods.
The progress of the revolution was judged in the states of Western Europe by the increa'ling use of machinery, the introduction of new inventions and manufacturing techniques, the percentage of the workforce engaged in agriculture versus industry, and the development of a supporting infrastructure. The leadership of the British in this area is unmistaken; they had forty of the first fifty steam engines developed, and they pioneered inventions like the flying shuttle, mechanized textile factories, ceramic ovens, modern cloth machines, and coke smelting. The British also had a larger percentage of their workers engaged in industry and other non-agricultural sectors than their rivals for leadership. 74% of the French workforce was in agriculture, compared to under 50% for the British. British workers were also much in demand throughout the continent because they were skilled at handling the new machinery. (27) Britain also led the way in creating an infrastructure to handle the increa ... ed economic activity. After 1750, the numb er of turnpikes authorized by Parliament jumped from an average of eight per year to an average of thirty-five per year. Starting in 1758, 165 new canals (spannin g 600-700
[Page 10] Journal of World-Systems Research miles) were constructed over the next forty years. (28) The ability of states to react to the changing economy wa'l judged on the taxes that were raised or lowered on economic activities, on the removal of regulatory restrictions with regard to internal trade or colonial trade, and the incentives provided for technolo gical innovations . The merchant organizations in Manchester, Lanca'lhire, York'lhir e, and Cheshire covered a broad range of business interests. They kept track of tax rates, lobbi ed for reduced transport fees, and argued for increa'led patent rights to encourage innovation and development. (29) Josiah Tucker's "The Elements of Comm erce and Th eory of Taxes " lent support to these efforts by drawin g the theoretical connection betw een taxes, tolls, and regulat ions, and the growth of economic trade within the state. This wa'l a key qualitative difference between Britain and France, where the Physiocrats were consistently fighting an uphill battle to remove internal restrictions. (30) Trading arrangements were evaluated using raw numbers for the values of import s and exports, shipping traffic, the levels of tariffa, and the freedom s granted to merchant s to operate in host countries. As an example, British shipping to Russia , her larg est trading partner during the century, was carefully monitored and compared to the efforts of the French and the Dutch. From a figure of 375 in 1700, the numb er of British m erchant ships serving Russia grew to 450 by 1760, reached 1100 ten years lat er, and peaked in 1 780 at 1400 ( outnumbering the French and Dutch by a ratio of 7: 1 each). (31) Similar record.., were kept by British merchants, envoys and travelling economists in Portu gal, Spain, Holland, France, Savoy and Sardinia. Overall shippin g carried by the British went from 317,000 tons in 1700 to 1,950,000 tons by 1800. The value of goods carried in British hulls also exploded from 12,000,000 pound.., to 62,000,000 in the same period.
The members of the community shared common policy objectives across the continent, both domestically and internationally. British political economists and merchants were represented in a growing number of political economy clubs. Th ese clubs were the forerunners of the General Chamb ers of Manufacturers and the Manchester Committee. The objectives were framed by the theoretical work of the economists, who were able to make their hypotheses with a surfeit of information provided by and buttressed by the practical experience of the merchants. The policy objectives in Britain were: reciproc al trade treaties, increasing the supply of raw materials for the growing factori es, encouraging capital investments, and insuring a stable tax structure to enc oura ge business activity. (33) [Page 11]
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The French Physiocrats, at the same time, were pushing for an end to arbitrary taxation of agricultural land, the removal of restrictions on the corn trade, reciprocal trad e tr eaties, decreases in internal tariff..,, tolls, and regulations, and incr ca..,cs in government infrastructur e programs. (34) Anti-cam eralists, a.., the liberals in the German states were known, were centered in the historic trading cities of Hamburg, Bremen, Lubeck, and Hanover. They were supported by economists ba.., cd at the University ofGotti ngcn, who argued for the remova l of restricti ons on agricultural trade, expandi ng trade with Britain after the death of Frederick the Great, and reducing the power of the central state authorities over individual econom ic actors. (3 5) In Russia, a Free Economic Society wa.., estab lished during the reign of Catheri ne the Great. The group wa.., patterned after the clubs of England and Scotland, kn own to the Russian merchants who traded there. They lobbied for increased rights for merchants involved in overseas trade, for increased power in government for members of the merchant class, and for the reduction of the government's power to grant exclusive monopolies in many economic ventures. (36) The Italian States saw the creation of a Chamber of Commerce in 1754 for the express purpose of improving infrastructures like roads, bridges, and ports. It also supported increased trade with Britain in the wine and woolens industries, as well as increasing the opportunities for foreign nationals to invest in Italy.
These examples demonstrate a remarkable degree of coordination across state and regional boundaries exhibited by similarly situated members of a growing community. The policy objectives they had in both the domestic and international arenas were specifically aimed at the uncertainty created by the new economic conditions. IV.
[ (37) The creation of a more liberal trading community as a respons e to the changing economic conditions of the Industrial Revolution serves as an example of the importanc e of th e social and cultural dimensions of world poli tics. The coalition was deliberatel y created under British leaders hip, leadership that began with an epistemic community centered in Britain which developed and diffused a set of values and beliefs through the repeated interactions of a set of elites. Those values and beliefs were then translated into coordinated government policies by decision-makers in Britain and its trading partn ers. These ideas resonated in two distinct groups, the political economy clubs of merchants and the more sophisticated circles of the Royal Society. In 1752 the political economy club of Glasgow, run by Andrew Cochrane, recruited a young professor nam ed Adam Smith. This club was already lobbying for the removal of many restrictions on colonial trade and offered a fertile ground for the ideas of the economists. Th e receptivity of merchants to new economic theories was supported by an educational system which stressed practical subjects like business administration and science, coupled with exchange programs between Scottish universities and schools on the continent. (40) This process of interaction between the theoretical and practical sides of int ernational trade advanced Adam Smith's thinking on liberali zed trade. By the 1770s, the economists were able to use the practical experience of the merchants to support their theoretical work, and the merchants in clubs were exposed to the evolving ideas of the economists and used them to argue for significant changes in tax, trade, and investment policies. The clubs spread to Manches ter , Lancashire, Yorkshire, Cheshire, and London, and culminated in the establishment of a General Chamber of Manufactur ers of Gr eat Britain in the 1780s. (41) Smith's first book, Theory of Moral Sentiments, brought him to the attention of the sophisticated circles of Hume and the political elite represented in the Royal Society. Charles Town shend offered Smith a position as tutor for his stepson, and Smith took advantag e of the position to tour the continent from 1764 to 1766 with his charge. He continued to work on "Wealth of Nations" during the tour, spending a year in Paris with Hume (who was serving as secretary to the Embassy). Hum e introduc ed him to French intellectual society, including a visit with Voltaire in Geneva that sealed his standing as a serious political economist of international importanc e. (42) The approval of the Royal Society and its members wa-; very important because of its unique position a-; a European social institution. The society had been established in 1662 to further the discovery and exchange of knowledge on a wide range of subjects throughout Britain. Its founding was followed within one hundred years by similar societies in Paris, Berlin, Philadelphia, and St. Petersburg. From its beginning, the society maintained contact-; between [Page 14]
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British and foreign scientists and writers, pursuing scholarly activities on an international ba.:;is. This wa-; a tradition handed down from the founder, Sir Isaac Newton, and gave the society first place among intellectual circles in Europe. ( 43) The first group on the continent to be influenced by the idea-; of the British economists were the French Physiocrats. They had a common view of economic processes, of idea-; about French society and its relation to other states, and a societal structure. The structure of the Physiocrat society took form in 1757 under the hand of Francois Qucsnay. Quesnay wa-; a doctor, a member of the court, and a fellow of the Royal Society of Britain. In these positions he wa-; exposed to the writings of the British and the French Intendants Gournay and Turgot. Qucsnay turned to economic matters in 1757, arguing that if Franc e concentrated on incrca-,ing its agricultural productivity and encouraged free trade, it could incr ca-;e it-, wealth, replenish the national trea-; ury, and create a more stable political system. Qucsnay and Hume kept in contact and it wa-; Qucsnay who enlisted Adam Smith into the French political economy club. Quesnay agreed with Smith on the importance of economic :fr eedom to the increased wealth of a society. Incrca-;cd internal and external flows of commodities and capital were essential to this process. Th e overall wealth of society, represented by individual rational economic actors, wa-; mor e important than protected royal monopolies, entrenched interest groups, and landed aristocrats. ( 4 7) The idea-; of British economists and merchants also had an impact on Russia, the country that would become Britain's largest tradin g partner in the second half of the century. There were twenty-eight merchant hous es which were part of the British estab lishment in St. Petersburg by 1782, and they also owned factories making rope, iron, indigo products, sugar refining, and cloth print-;. Thes e merchants enjoyed considerable pri vileges and positions of promin ence in society. (48 (50) This interaction between merchants, coupled with the establishment of the economic society, led to its becoming the center of a small, but influential, group of merchant.., and intelligentsia who started arguing for the same economic system which wa.., propelling the British and the French to the forefront. (51) At the other end of the spectrum lay the relationship between the British and the Dutch. Close ties had existed since the days of Elizabeth I and the wars for liberation against Phillip's Spain. Those ties had increased during the reign of William of Orang e and the wars to contain the expansionist power of Louis XN's Franc e. William, marri ed to Princess Mary, wa.., offered the crown of England during the Glorious Revoluti on of 1688, and he succeeded in merging the foreign policies of the two states to serve a', the core of the anti-French alliances of the global wars la..,ting from 1688 to 1713. Aft er th e end of the la..,t of the Anglo-Dutch naval wars of the 1660s, the economies of the two states were drawn together by the commodity and capital flows between the growin g power of London and the investment seekers of Amsterdam and Rotterdam . Lib erali zed regulations on capital flows were favored by bankers and merchants of both states. By th e end of the 1750s one-third of the depositors in the Bank of Rotterdam were British, and the Bank of Amsterdam wa.., supported by an influx of British capital to forstall a panic in 1763. On this two-way street, the Dutch were holding an estimat ed fifteen percent of Britain's national debt at the same time. (52) This practical push for chan ging economic rules wa.., reinforced by educational exchanges between Scottish and Dutch univ ersiti es, the translation and the sale of the works of Smith, Tuck.er, and Hume, and the interactions of the political economy clubs of Amsterdam and Rotterdam with those in Britain . (53) The community wa.., extended into the Italian States (including Venice, Florence, Savoy and Sardinia) through the efforts of the British representati ve to the court at Savoy and Sardinia, Lord Rocheford. Comm erce in this region, gaining in importanc e since the Wars of Austrian Succession in 1740-1748, led to an incrca.., cd opportunity for British influenc e. British minin g companies in the region operated throu ghout this period, but were subject to the vagaries of tradi tional royal monopolies and shifting political forces. Working with local merchants in the shipping and import businesses, the British busin ess owners and Lord Rocheford helped establish a local Chamber of Commerce. The chamber's members believed in improvin g the domestic in:fra..,trnctur c ( especially port faciliti es) and incrca..,ing silver and wine exports. (54) [Page 16]
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The la..,t places to be included in the epistemic community were the German States. While this may seem at odds with the strong dyna..,tic ties that existed between England and the Hanoverians (who supplied the three Georges to be Icings of England for most of the 1700s), the influence of Frederick. the Great's wars to solidify the continental position of Prussia wa.., such that the idea.., of the community were restricted to academic circles until Frederick's death. Frederick. wa.., determined to subordinate trade, commerce, and international contacts to wartime self-sufficiency directed from a highly centralized state structure. (55) Importing idea.., and influences from Britain wa.., also difficult in the face of British and Prussian cla..,hes over the peace settlements at the end of the Seven Years war.
The inroads of the epistemic community were made in the ports of Hamburg, Bremen, and Lubeck because of their traditional role a.., entrepots to the interior of Central Europe, and in universities. At the University ofGottingen, The Wealth ofNations wa.., translated by J.F. Schiller in 1776, and given a very favorable review by J.G.H. Feder the next spring. F eder's fellow professor Georg Sartorius wa.., so impressed that he started a course in political economy ba..,ed on Smithian principles, and followed it up with a short tract titled, A Summary of State Econom y: Ba..,ed on Adam Smith's Principl es, for use with Academic Lectures. Christian Kraus, then a visiting professor from Konigsb erg, return ed to its university and spread the Smithian idea.., in political economy cla..,ses there. Isaak Iselin, another Gottingen professor, wa.., also influenced by the Physiocrats. H e shared the ba..,ic theoretical views on the sources of economic wealth, the role of the state in the economy, and the importance of expanding trade. At this time, the universities were much more liberal than Frederick's government, but his death in 1786 would be the watershed event for the rapid spread of the idea.., of the epistemic community into the German States. (56) v.
The acid test of an epistemic communi ty is whether or not its views, which have circulated and come to dominanc e within an expert environment, come to the attention of policymakers and are then adopted a.., government policies by the states of the community. The common policy enterprise that has been the focus of intens e community interaction must be Even before the revolutionary policies of Shelbourne and Pitt, there were chan ges in trading relations with European states from Russia to Italy. Between 1750 and 1783 tariff... were reduced on imports that were essential to the leading economic sectors of textiles and iron manufactures, foreign merchants were granted greater freedoms and shipping rights, and 'most favored nation' status wa.., granted to states that reciprocated these actions.
In France, the Physiocrats enjoyed good access to economic policymakers and were successful in changing both domestic and trade polici es. In 1757 Quesnay met with the first minister (Mirab eau), who believ ed that the government of Franc e had to be decentralized and deregulated in order to encourage the creation of wealth. Other French officials supported Mirabeau and the Physiocrats, like the governor of Martiniqu e who wrot e a 1767 treatise on opening up trade in the Caribbean in order to," ... allow each state to pursue its greatest natural advantage." (60) This book wa.., the subject of Physiocrat meetings and applauded by Smith on his trip to France. It also found its way to the Russian amba..,sador to France and wa.., forwarded Mirabeau and the Physiocrats were triumphant; domestic policy was changed to reduce internal tariffa that restricted the movement of goods, government regulations and the arbitrary powers of the inspectors were reduced, and the road and canal network s were improved, while foreign policy wa.., highlighted by the signing of th e Anglo-Fr ench treaty (negotiated by Royal Society member DuPont de Nemours) in the same year. (61) In the Italian States, discriminatory tariffa were removed in 1754 and the rights of Britsh merchants against arbitrary changes in taxation were stengthen ed. Both of these mea..,ures preceded the signing of new commercial agreements that granted each nation 'most favored nation' status and expanded the role of the Royal Nav y in the Mediterranean. (62) The situation in Russia also improved in this period. British merchant.., were allowed to operate in the country's interior (Moscow, Tula, and Kursk), when merchants from other states were limited to St. Petersburg and other Baltic port cities. (63) This gave the British access to lucrative mining, timber, and grain industries , helping to fuel the process of industrialization underway in Britain. The 1766 commercial agre ement between Britain and Russia contained a 'most favored nation' clause, increa..,e d the freedoms for merchants of both states, and va..,tly increa..,ed the value of Ru ssian exports to Britain .
The most significant changes in state policies took place in Prussia after the death of Frederick the Great. A new generation of government officials would begin to put into practice the idea.., of their univ ersity professors, men who had been a part of th e epistemic community for the prevous ten to fifteen years .
August Lueder, graduate ofGottingen and court concillor in the 1790s, pushed forward policies that granted greater economic freedoms for individu als to trade oversea..,, accumulate capital, and put that capital to work anywhere in Europ e. (64) Fri edrich von Schrotter became minister in charge ofEa..,t Prussia, succeeding in loosening restrictions on the grain trade. Theodor von Schon became the minister responibl e for agricultur e in general. After travelling to England and spending three years at the Univ ersity of Konigsberg, von Schon issued the Edict of Emancipation, which freed small farmers from onerous state restrictions on the sale of wheat. Hans von Auerswald serv ed a.., concillor to the Chamber of War an d Domains and wa.., respo nsible for coordinating Prussia's trad e policies during the Napoleonic Wars.
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All of the offici als men tioned above were connected to professors who had been at Gottingen and influ enced by the work of Adam Smith and the Physiocrats. The la..,t three were students of Kraus : with von Schrotter making it a polic y that offic ials working for him be certifi ed a.., qualified by Kraus, von Schon studying under him for thr ee years at Konigsberg, and von Auerswald living with Kraus in 1773 and keeping in close contact with him a-; a friend and correspondent for years. (65) VI.
By expanding the study of epistemic communities with a historical dimension , is a richer and more detailed analysis of the requirements for global leadership provided? Is the connection between agenda setting and future global leadership strengthened?
Is there an appropriate analogy that can be drawn from the example of the Georgian transition to the ca-;e of the changing world system of the pa-;t twenty years and into the next period of agenda setting and coalition formation? What can we learn about: 1) agenda setting, 2) epistemic communities, and 3) coalition creation that students and practitioners of foreign policy can use a-; a guide for leadership of the unfolding cycle of world politics?
The global problems of the United States leadership of the world system after World War II were the reconstruction of a war-torn world, the provision of security for a small group of liberal, democratic capitalist states, and the restoration of a stable, open economic system linking North America, Western Europe, and Ea-;t A-;ia. That period of leadership effectively ended in 1973 without a clear successor to leadership on the hori zon. American leadership ha-; been effectively extended until the next macrod ecision in approximately 2020-2030, a-; the system enters a period of uncertainty about the defining issues of world politics and the coalitions that will be created to resolve those issues .
Like the situation in the middle of the 1700s, current world politics is once again in a pha-;e of agenda setting. This pha-;e is characterized by the ris e of new problem s in world politics , a rise in global disorder with an accompanying decline in the demand for order.
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The new problems facing the world political system arc related to politics and society, security, and economics, but they are va-;tly different from traditional conceptions of these issue area-;.
The first of these is the issue of consolidating and expanding the democratic community of states. Michael Doyle's work in this area is the best known of writings on the subject. (66) He identifi es the problems to be handled in the near future a-; the protection of the members of the community and the fostering of conditions favorable to community growth. (67) The process ha-; been underway for at lea-;t ten years, but it ha-; reached the public consciousness in the pa-;t five years because of the democratic changes in the former Ea-;tern bloc. These states, along with new democraci es in Latin America and Ea-;t A-;ia, have all sough t to j oin a community of state s charaterized by numerous political, economic, social, and security ties, both formal and informal. The decision s regarding the inclusion of new states into the community arc important ones for the world system because in Doyle's words, "the liberal community of states is the single best hope for a stable,just, and secure international order." (68) The second new problem on the agenda is to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. If the warnings of President Kennedy that within twenty years there would twenty nuclear powers have not come true, it is not a cause for complac ency. The nude ar club has grown from five (United States, Russia, Britain, France, and China) to include India and Israel for sure, and most likely Pakistan and North Korea.
To prevent the rise of new nuclear states, the world system has used global treati es (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty), regional treaties (Latin America Nuclear Free Zone), military actions (Iraq 1981 and , and economic pressure (North Korea).
The world system, for so long focused on the bilateral competition between East and West on this issue, now faces problems of proliferation on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and the missile systems needed to deliver them. The break-up of the Soviet Union led to the creation of three new nuclear powers, and the fear that they might solve their economic problems by selling such technology to other states. The success of the Persian Gulf War in 1991 did not completely deal with the problems of proliferation in Iran, Libya, Algeria, Syria, Saudi Arabia, or even Iraq. The prospects of North Korea possessing such weapons and delivery systems would increase the pressur e on states like Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea to follow suit.
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The problem expands dramatically when it is combined with the export of materials , component parts, or whole systems by technologically advanced states from Europ e, North America, the former Soviet bloc, Brazil, and Israel. This is a different probl em than the one posed by the competition in all of these areas by the United Stat es and the Soviet Union.
The third problem, while related to economics , is a far cry from the dominant economic concerns of the post-war era. I refer to the global, regional, and national problem-. arising out of the interaction between economic growth and environmental protection. Th e postwar period was dominated by issues of free trade, monetary stability, economic growth, a-.sistance for industrial development, and the creation of jobs. An entire range of international organizations was created to handle these issues and American leadership of the system wa-. exercised through the IMF, the World Bank, the GATT, the Int erAmerican Developm ent Bank, the Marshall Plan, and other programs too numerous to mention. In all of these matters, environmental concerns were subordinat ed to questions of growth and development. It has only been since the 1970s that such questions have moved to the forefront of national and international economic deliberations.
At the national level, legislation on clean water, clean air, toxic wastes, and recycling wa.., a hallmark of the 1970s in industrial democracies. As these problems were proven to have effects that transcended national boundaries, states moved to regional solutions in the 1980s. Agreements on acid rain, pollution of the sea.., and rivers, the dumping of wa..,te at sea, and whaling limits all came about when economic interests met with new environmental interests. As the 1980s came to a close and the 1990s began, the preservation of the rain forests, biodiversity, ozone depletion, and global wanning all reached the agenda of global political problems.
Instead of a clear dominance by the political interests of national governments and their independent economic policies, these new issues raise questions of population growth, sovereign control of resources, the inclusion of new groups in decision-making, the development of new industries, types and uses of energy, and the preservation of resources that belong to no one state. Placing these on the global agenda mixes economics and the environment in a new way that changes old concepts of national interest, international responsibility, and development.
The importance of idea.., in this process ha.., gained increa..,ed attention and credibility in recent political science literature. (69) With regard to the three problems listed above, the United 
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States is the nation with epistemic community leadership across all three area..,. I will examine one of these in depth to illustrate this point; the problem of nuclear proliferation.
On the issue of non-proliferation, the United States ha.., taken the lead on a number of fronts. With regard to chemical and biological weapons, the United States and the former Soviet Union signed agreements eliminating these cla..,scs of weapons. The United States took economic and military steps to stop their spread to countri es like Lib ya and Iraq . It took diplomatic steps to reinforce the 1925 treaty of biological and chemical weapons control. In the afterma th of the Persian Gulf War, the United States arranged discussions with other industrial states to limit the export of equipment and mat erials that could be directed toward the production of these weapons.
The Non-Proliferation Trea ty of 1968 included a proviso that the superpow ers would seriously limi t their nuclear arsenals a.., a quid pro quo for non-nucl ear powers refraining from starting nuclear programs. The end of the cold war allowed this to happ en . In an amazing turn around, the superpow ers signed the INF agreement in 1987, followed by the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons from Europ e. They sign ed a ST ART agreement which reduced strategic nuclear warheads from over 10,000 per side to 6,000 per side, and a follow up agreement which will drop that number to 3,000 warheads per side by the end of the century. (70) With this, the United States has turned its attention to limiting the nuclear programs of smaller, regional threats. Economic incentives were used to persuade the new states of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to end the nuclear programs they inherited with the fall of the Soviet Union. Military force was used to address the threat oflraq becoming a regional nuclear power. Diplomacy , economic pressure, and the threat of force have all been used to stop the threat of a North Kor ean breakout from the 1968 treaty. (71) An epistemic community of nuclear scientists, nuclear strategists, and responsibl e officials in governments and international organizations has grown and developed since the 1940s. The end of the Cold War in 1989 shifted the focus of this community from the superpower conflict and the prevention of nuclear war between them. The community now aims its attention at the dangers to world order posed by the uncontroll ed spread of weapons of mass destruction. (72) In 1988 and 1989 there were only three articles each year on nuclear non-proliferation listed in "International Political Science Abstracts". In 1990, that number jumped to nine; in 1991 it went to twelve; in 1992 it was up to thirteen ; and by 1993 there were fifteen articles. These articles were written by members from every segment of the group listed above, from academics to policy makers.
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A community must exhibit a common understanding of the natur e and causes of a policy problem on the agenda. The natur e of the problem is agreed to be delineated as: strengthening the powers of the IAEA, controlling the exports of nuclear or nuel earcapablc technology, reducing the availability of plutonium and enriched uranium, and enhancing the security of states threatened by the proliferatrion efforts of outlaw states. The break-up of the USSR (with the attendant economic and social instabilit y) has seriously loosened once strict controls on nuclear materials, technology, and scientists. There has also been an increase in the global access to weapons information. This has coincided with improv ements in minituri zation, computerization, and technology that have reduced the costs of producin g nuclear weapons. States wanting to go nuclear have seen the success oflsrael, India, and Pakistan ( and possibly North Korea) in avoiding international sanction in their proliferation efforts, and are bolstered in their belief that they might be the next to succeed . It is the combination of these factor s that give rise to putting prolifera tion on the global agenda. (73) This community has regular interchanges designed to enhance their own understanding of the problems , diffuse their ideas to others in the system, and make their assessments and alternative solutions known to decision makers. Union to safely reduc e weapons, stockpiles, and materials, and to enhance the security of their facilities. The Bush Administration took the lead in the aftermath of th e Gulf War to expand the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to twenty-seven members. This group wa..:; founded in 1975 and ba..:;cd on the Western Suppliers Group founded in 1954 . lt wa..:; expanded to take into account the growth in the number of states producing materials and weapons systems that could be used in nucle ar programs. (76) Also during the Bush Administration, South Africa and France agreed to sign the NPT and take a m ore active role in non-proliferation issues, and the People's Republic of China took its first steps toward cooperation with the NSG. Argentina and Brazil agreed to IAEA safeguards for the first time , and the EC supported the American position for more string ent export safeguards on dual-us e technology.
The Clinton Administration continued to stress the importanc e of non-proliferation in its first year. The FBI opened up an office in Moscow to help the Russians run a joint operatio n to stop the spread of nuclear information, materials, and technology from Russia , Ukraine , and Kazakhstan. lncr ca..:; cd economic aid to these states wa..:; condition ed on nuclear agreements on weapons dest ruction and non -prolifera tion efforts. John Dcutch, the new Assistant Secretary for Defense, wrote that, "nuclear proliferation replaces the fear of su perpower conflict. 11 (77) The proble m of proliferation ha..:; leapt t o center stage in the pa..:;t four years, with th e 1995 conference on the renewal and revision of the Non-P roliferation Treaty at its heart . The interests of the United States, its allies, the newly independ ent states of the former Sovie t Union, and the exporti ng states from China to Brazil will be pitted against the interests and a..:; pirations of a few out law states.
The challenge for the United States is to demonstrate leadership on supply-side control~ and to work with other states to resolve regional conflicts in area~ where nucl ear proliferation is seen a~ the answer to the security dilemma.
VII.
Starting from a long cycle perspective, with a specific focus on the pha~es of agenda setting and coalition building, ha~ made it possible to use Rapkin 's definition of leadership to mca~urc the effectiveness and role of epistemic communities. If agenda setting is defining, clarifying, and prioritizing new global problems and alternative solutions, then an cxaminaton of [Page 25] Journa I of World-Systems Research the role of epistemic communities is a good place to start. To avoid historical hindsight, it is necessary to analyze the social interactions of the members of th e community and the policymakers of the states to correctly put idea~ before outcomes .
In this ca~c, community members wrot e book~, articles and pamphlets, organiz ed academic groups and economic coalitions, and consistently interacte d with government officials. They correctly a~scsscd the changes being wrought by the indu stria l revo luti on on internal economics and external trade relations between states. They set the definition s for the new situation, provided clear methods of evaluating the situation and current government policies, and then laid out the alternativ e policy options (giving priority to certain political and economic values).
By using Rapkin's definition of leade rship, we can set good parameters for assessing the effectiveness of th e community. First, it clearly performed the ta~k of agenda setting set forth above. Second, its members were able to persuade governments across Europe to change both internal and exte rnal policies in the face of long-standing contrary idea~ about economic wea lth and state power. Third, the idea~ of the community (a~ well a~ th e states putting them into practice) were successful in international competition against mercantilis tic and nationalistic policies, highlighted by the defeat of Napoleonic France by a series of British-led coalitions. La~tly, the people and groups in Britain who were at the heart of th e community, served a~ role models for other national communiti es and demonstrated how to effect changes in state policies.
Community members and policymakers of the 1740 to 1792 period were aware of th e growing importance of the industria l revo lution and its consequences for world politics. Today, members of ep istemic communities and some policymakers arc aware that one period of world politics ha~ end ed and a new one ha~ begun. Students looking for th e future course of world politics need to recogniz e that there is agend a setting go ing on now. Leadership in the new agenda areas will determine the near-future course of world politics and the determination ofleadership of the world system.
